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WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY THE
ACCUSED
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution' forbids
all "unreasonable" searches and seizures. In general, the standard of
"reasonableness" is a search warrant based on a sworn statement of
probable cause issued by a magistrate.2  A person 3 may waive his
rights under the Fourth Amendment by voluntarily consenting to the
search. However, if a consent is to function as a waiver, it must be un-
equivocal, specific, and intelligently given; uncontaminated by any duress
or coercion, express or implied.4 The courts indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver,5 and the burden is on the government to
prove an effective consent by clear and positive evidence. 6 Under the
decisions in Mapp v. Ohio7 and Ker v. California" these Fourth Amend-
ment standards are applied to the states by way of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
1 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.''
The related provision of the Montana Constitution, Art. III, §7, is substantially the
same except for a requirement that the statement of probable cause be reduced to
writing.
'United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-107 (1965); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
3For discussion of the related problems of third party and inter-spousal consents see:
33 University of Chicago Law Review 797 (Summer, 1966); 1964 University of
Illinois Law Forum 653 (Fall, 1964); 2 University of San Francisco Law Review
141 (Oct. 1967).
4Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967); Wren v. United States, 352
F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 384 U.S. 944 (1966); Cipres v. United
States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965); Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987, 989
(9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1962); Judd v.
United States, 190 F.2d 649, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
'Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827
(10th Cir. 1965); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Page, supra note 4; Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th
Cir. 1962).
6Gorman v. United States, supra note 4; Montana v. Tomich, supra note 4 at 989;
Judd v. United States, supra note 4 at 650-51.
7347 U.S. 643 (1961).
'374 U.S. 23 (1963).
'Massachusetts v. Painten, 368 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1966), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S.
560 (1968); Montana v. Tomich, sura note 4; Hubbard v. Tinsley, 336 F.2d 854
(10th Cir. 1964); Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1964).
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PROCEDURE AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
The question of whether the defendant has waived his Fourth Amend-
ment rights almost invariably arises in the form of a motion to suppress
evidence found in the course of the search. 10 When such a motion is
properly raised, the trial court11 must conduct an evidentiary hearing12 to
resolve the factual1 3 issues.
In reviewing the evidence, the court is not limited to any particular
criteria; nor is any one factor conclusive 14 as to either the presence of a
waiver or its absence. The examination is made of the totality of circum-
stances15 which surround the consent and subsequent search. Throughout
this examination, the presumption is against waiver, and the burden is
on the state to prove voluntariness by "clear and positive evidence."1 6
Because the issue is a factual one, the conclusions of the trial court
are given great weight on review, especially where there has been con-
flicting testimony 1 7 or if the court has made specific findings of fact.'
8
The appellate court will, however, review the entire record to determine
whether the state has sustained its burden under the totality of circum-
stances test"9 and to see if there is "clear error '20 in any specific finding.
It is not bound by the bare conclusion that the accused consented to the
search.
2'
"°The exclusionary rule was developed for the Federal courts in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), and was applied to the states as a Constitutional requirement
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Cf.
ROM 95-1806. Note also that the question of waiver only arises when the evidence
sought to be admitted has not been otherwise lawfully seized, for example by a
search warrant or reasonably incident to a valid arrest.
"Tatum v. United States, 321 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1963); Hoing v. United States,
208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Bianco, 96 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1938).
'Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Hubbard v. Tinsley, 336 F.2d 854 (10th
Cir. 1964). Cf. RMC 95-1806(e); F. R. Crim. Pro. 41(e).
uUnitea States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. den. 360 U.S. 912
(1959); United States v. Bianco, supra note 11; United States v. Martin, 176 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
"United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610 (2nd Cir.), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1005 (1968)
(fact that the defendant was fully advised of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ment rights outweighed facts that he was in custody, had been told that it was best
to cooperate and mention of a search warrant); State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423,
384 P.2d 777 (1963) (officers' persistence in obtaining consent was overcome by
fact that the defendant himself was a police officer).
uCipres v. United States, supra note 4; Hoing v. United States, supra note 11.
"United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2nd Cir. 1965). By this standard, RCM
95-1806(f) appears to be unconstitutional at least insofar as it requires the de-
fendant to prove that he did not waive his Fourth Amendment rights.
'Rogers v. United States, 369 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. den., sub nom. Ferguson
v. United States, 388 U.S. 922 (1967); United States v. Ziemer, 291 F.2d 100 (7th
Cir.), cert den., 368 U.S. 877 (1961); Hoing v. United States, supra note 11.
"Hubbard v. Tinsley, supra note 9.
9Cipres v. United States, supra note 4; 'United States v. Page, supra note 4.
"'Villano v. United States, supra note 5.
"Montana v. Tomich, supra note 4.
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To be free from coercion, any words or acts of consent must be the
voluntary product of a free will, however unhappily expressed,22 and not
the product of hope or fear 23 or peaceful submission to authority.
24
If there has been "direct" coercion, in the sense of actual intimidation,
either by the police 2 5 or by some other governmental agency,26 it is
almost invariably held that any assent to search was not voluntarily given.
In close situations, however, the result may turn as much on the character
and action of the accused as on those of the police.
The courts have long recognized 7 that a police dominated atmos-
phere is inherently coercive. Accordingly, where the police display their
badges, announce their purpose is to search, and ask the accused if he
has any objections, 28 or in other ways indicate that a search will be
carried on in any event, 29 permission to search is generally interpreted
as a peaceful submission to authority rather than a true waiver. This is
especially true where other coercive circumstances are present30
A similar result occurs where the police persist in requesting per-
mission to search until the defendant consents. However, the presump-
tion of coercion here may be overcome by a strong showing that the per-
sistence of the police did not in fact coerce the defendant, especially by
showing that he was at all times aware of his right to require the police
to obtain a search warrant.3'
A more complex question arises when the police tell the accused that
he might as well consent since they can obtain a search warrant in any
event. It has been held that such a statement, without more, is not suf-
ficiently coercive to invalidate a consent. 2 However, the courts are quick
"Gorman v. United States, supra note 4.
"United States v. Baldocci, 42 FP.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
'Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); United States v. Slusser, 270 F. 818
(S.D. Ohio 1921).
Villano v. United States, supra note 5 (defendant taken from his house late at night
by officers who pushed him around and used intimidating language); Judd v.
United States, supra note 4 (night-time arrest; ''consent" came after hours of
questioning).
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (court order); Nelson v. United States,
208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.),cert den., 346 U.S. 827 (1953) (Senate subcommittee brow-
beat witness and threatened him with contempt).
'Amos v. United States, supra note 24. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'Amos v. United States, supra note 24; Massachusetts v. Painten, supra note 9;
Villano v. United States, supra note 5; Farris v. United States, 24 F.2d 639 (9th
Cir.), cert den., 277 U.S. 607 (1928); United States v. Slusser, supra note 24.
'Farris v. United States, supra note 28.
'United States v. Brennan, 251 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (six heavily armed
agents; early morning "raid"); United States v. Nikrasch 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.
1966) (defendant in custody). But see McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272
(10th Cir. 1962).
-"United States v. Jordan, supra note 14; Cf. State v. Moran, supra note 14.
"Gatterdam v. United States, 5 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1925).
1969]
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to hold the opposite if other coercive circumstances are present,3 3 and
it is universally held that the defendant does not waive his rights by
permitting a search when confronted by a purported or void3 4 search
warrant.
IN-CUSTODY CONSENT
While the Federal courts have held that the mere fact that a person
is in custody does not prevent him from waiving his Fourth Amendment
rights,3 5 the burden on the state of proving freedom from coercion is
particularly heavy.36 This is especially true where the accused has been
held incommunicado for long periods37 or where other coercive circum-
stances are present.
3 8
In addition, if the defendant has not been given his Miranda9 warn-
ing, any evidence obtained as a result of an in-custody consent to search
may be subject to suppression on Fifth Amendment grounds. Historically,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted a close and intimate relation-
ship in the scope, purpose, and effect of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments.40 In view of this, there would seem to be no compelling or even
rational reason why the exceedingly broad language of Miranda4 1 would
not apply to a statement which gave the police permission to search as
well as to an admission or confession in the strict sense. The evidence
seized would then be subject to suppression as a "fruit of the poisonous
tree" under the rule of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.
42
uUnited States v. Baldocci, supra note 23 (defendant under arrest).
'United States v. Scott, 102 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Tex. 1950).
'United States v. Page, supra note 4; Raimondi v. United States, 207 F.2d 695 (9th
Cir. 1953) (by implication); Ruh] v. United States, 148 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1945).
"United States v. Jordan, supra note 14; Hubbard v. Tinsley, supra note 9; Wion
v. United States, supra note 5; Watson v. United States, 249 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1057); Judd v. United States, supra note 4.
"7United States v. Nikrasch, supra note 30; United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630
(7th Cir. 1954); Judd v. United States, supra note 4. Contra, McDonald v. United
States, supra note 30.8 Villano v. United States, supra note 5.
uMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Boyd v. United States, supra note 26; Gould v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S.487 (1944).
41"The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion
of today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by the defendant. No distinction can be drawn
between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to
'admissions' of part or all of the offense. The privilege against self-incrimination
protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner;
it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.' 384 U.S. at 476.
-251 U.S. 385 (1920). Accord, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
'United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610 (2nd Cir. 1968); Forman v. United States,
380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967); United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837 (2nd Cir.),
cert. den., 382 U.S. 987 (1965).
"Supra, note 36.
"Supra, note 39 at 467.
[Vol. 31
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Conversely, some courts 43 have held that where the defendant has
been given his Miranda warning, the "heavy burden" rule44 no longer
applies. The reason usually given is that the Miranda warning acts to
minimize the "inherently compelling pressures"'52 of custodial interroga-
tion, which was the reason for the earlier rule.
CHARACTER AND EXPERIENCE OF THE ACCUSED
Because the question of waiver is primarily subjective in nature, one
of the most important factors in determining the presence or absence
of coercion is the personality, training, and experience of the accused.
For example, if a person is a housewife, 46 a mental defective, 47 a member
of a suspect and persecuted class, 48 or is inarticulate, 49 illiterate, 50 or
does not speak English, 51 the burden on the state to show that the
consent was the voluntary product of a free will is considerably heavier.
On the other hand, if the accused's background tends to indicate
that he has knowledge of police procedures and of his rights to remain
silent and to require a search warrant, there is strong evidence that his
consent was uncoerced. 52 It should be remembered, however, that the
accused's training and experience are but one factor in the "totality of
circumstances"; and if the coercive circumstances are strong enough,
the consent of even the most hardened criminal must fall.
53
CHARACTER OF THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE SUPPRESSED
The courts also tend to examine the nature of the evidence found
and when and how the alleged consent was given to determine if it is
inherently reasonable that a person could voluntarily consent under
such circumstances.
If the evidence found is contraband and the accused has denied his
guilt, a presumption arises that any consent in fact was coerced because
"... no sane man who denies his guilt would actually be willing that
"Amos v. United States, supra note 24.
17 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (by implication, coerced confession
case).
"Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944) (Japanese-American during
World War II).
"United States v. Wallace, 169 F. Supp. 859 (D. D.C. 1958).
'Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
"United States v. Wai Lau, 215 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. N.Y. 1963); United States v.
Ong Goon Sing, 149 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
'Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d 211 (1st Cir. 1964), cert den., 379 U.S. 971 (1965)
(lawyer) ; Tatum v. United States, supra note 11 (private detective) ; State v. Moran,
supra note 14 (police officer).
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policemen search his room for contraband which is certain to be found. '5 4
Such a presumption may be rebutted by evidence tending to show that
the defendant believed that the contraband was not present 55 or was too
well hidden to be found.
5 6
The relation of the evidence found to the circumstances surrounding
the alleged consent may also be a factor favoring waiver. Thus, if the
evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching in nature,5 7 or if the facts
tend to show that the defendant did not appreciate its evidentiary values
against him,58 there is some inference that the consent was uncoerced. A
similar inference arises if the consent has come after the accused has
voluntarily confessed or made damaging admissions against interest.5 9
COOPERATION IN THE SEARCH
Another factor tending to indicate a consent free from coercion is
where the accused actively assists in the search. 60 Such affirmative
assistance may be in the form of handing over a set of keys,61 by point-
ing out where the evidence is located 62 or instructing another to show
it to the officers, 63 by indicating the nature of the evidence, 64 or by physi-
cally assisting in the search.65
Again, the opposite is equally true; and if the accused, even though
he has given some sort of verbal assent, is evasive or uncooperative, the
courts may find that the consent was not truly voluntary.6
'Higgens v. United States, 209 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1951). Accord, Cipres v. United
States, supra note 4; United States v. Shropshire, 271 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1967) ;
United States v. Wallace, sura note 49 (dictum, applied to 'mere evidence'). But
See Raimondi v. United States, supra note 35.
'6Higgens v. United States, supra note 54 at 819 (dictum).
5Grice v. United States, 146 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1945).
5'Gorman v. United States, supra note 4
"United States v. Torres, 354 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1966) (money from sale of narcotics);
United States v. Dornblut, supra note 13 (marked money).
'United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837 (2nd Cir. 1965).
'United States v. Sith, 308 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert .den., 372 U.S. 906
(1963) ; United States v. Sferras, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert den., sub. mon. Skally
v. United States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
'Robinson v. United States, 325 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1964).
"Rogers v. United States, supra note 17; Raimondi v. United States, supra note 35.
"Windsor v. United States, 286 F. 51 (6th Cir. 1923).
"United States v. Torres, supra note 58.
'United States ex. rel. Anderson v. Rundle, 274 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd.
393 F.2d 635 (3rd Cir. 1968).
'Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1958) (refusal to sign written
waiver); Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963) (long delay before
admitting officers; refusal to sign written waiver) ; Montana v. Tomich, supra note 4
key hidden in shoe) ; Cipres v. United States, supra note 4 (defendant told officers
that suitcase was locked and key was in another city).
[ Vol. 31
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SPECIFIC AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSENT
The requirement that any consent, if it is to function as a waiver,
must be both specific and unequivocal derives from the Constitutional
prohibition against general exploratory searches.Y
7
Although there has been little litigation on the issue, the measure of
specificity seems to be whether the place searched is reasonably included
in the permission given."" As always, the scope of the permission is
measured by the words of consent and the "totality of circumstances"
under which they were spoken. A necessary corollary to this rule is that
a person may condition or limit his consent as he wishes, and the police
are bound to stay within the limits of the consent.
To meet the standard of unequivocalness, the state must show that
the accused truly manifested an intent to allow the search. For example,
merely indicating where an object is located is not consent to search it, 9
nor can such consent be presumed from the defendant's failure to pro-
test.70
Even if the accused has given some form of verbal assent, equivocal-
ness can still be shown from his contemporaneous actions. Refusal to
sign a written waiver is strong7' but not conclusive evidence that the
defendant did not clearly intend to allow the search. Equivocalness may
also be found if the accused is hesitant,7 2 nervous,7 3 evasive,74 or in
other ways uncooperative at the time verbal assent was given.
INTELLIGENT CONSENT
Broadly stated, for there to be a waiver of a fundamental Constitu-
tional right, there must be " ... an intentional abandonment of a known
right of privilege."7 5
At the very least, this standard requires that the state prove that
the accused could comprehend what he was doing when he gave the
67Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, supra note 40. Cf. Boyd v. United
States, supra note 26; Gould v. United States, 255 U.S., supra note 40.
6'Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. den., 384 U.S. 944
(1966) (written waiver to search "my residence" includes garage on property);
Karwicki v. United States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1932) (oral consent to search
near beer saloon not consent to search adjoining house).
69Whitley v. United States, 237 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1956).
7 Canida v. United States, supra note 66.
7 Pekar v. United States, supra note 66; Canida v. United Slates, supra note 26.
72 Pekar v. United States, supra note 66.
7IM.
7'Cipres v. United States, supra note 4; Montana v. Tomich, supra note 4.
75Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 5.
1969]
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alleged assent. If the defendant is a mental defective, 76 illiterate, 77
unable to speak English, 78 or intoxicated, 79 the state's burden is very
great indeed. Likewise, a consent is not intelligently given if obtained
by fraud, whether in the "inducement" 0 or in the "execution."8'
However, for there to be such a fraud as to invalidate a consent, it
must be shown that the police deliberately deceived the accused82 and
that the misrepresentation in turn caused 8 ' the accused to give his
assent to the search. If these standards are met, it does not make any
difference whether the misrepresentation was one of fact, 4 law,8 5 or
the officer's intent toward the accused.8 6
The outer limits of what constitutes a fraud by government agents
has been explored in a series of cases dealing with inspections of regu-
latory or taxing agencies.8 7 These cases have held that while an agent
may not make active misrepresentations,8 8 he is under no affirmative
duty to disclose when his investigations have turned from civil to crim-
inal in nature. The principal rationale for this rule, as advanced in
United States v. Sclafani,8 9 is that the presence of the agent by itself is
sufficient warning, since he could hardly be expected to refrain from




'United States v. Shropshire, supra note 64. Contra, United States v. Hickey, 247
F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (both decisions could have rested on alternate
grounds).
'United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954); United States v. Ong
Goon Sing, supra note 51.
'United States v. Brennan, supra note 30.
2United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918 (1959)
(dictum); Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. dea., 382
U.S. 909 (1965); United States v. Como, supra note 16; United States v. Horton,
328 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir.), cert den., 377 U.S. 970 (1964); United States v. Hecht,
259 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
'United States v. Hecht, supra note 82; United States v. General Pharmacal Co., 205
F. Supp. 692 (D. N.J. 1962); United States v. Martin, supra note 13.
'United States v. Reckis, supra note 80 (business call); United States v. Ong Goon
Sing, supra note 51 (officers were there to assist defendant in proving that his sons
were American citizens).
8Supra, note 49. But there is no affirmative duty to warn the accused of all the
possible legal ramifications of his act. Burnham v. United States, 297 F.2d 523
(1st Cir. 1961).
"Supra, note 16.
'United States v. Selafani, supra note 82; Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926
(4th Cir.), cert. den., 350 U.S. 831 (1955); Application of Greene, 192 F. Supp.
49 (W.D. N.Y.), aff'd. 296 F.2d 841 (2nd Cir. 1961), vacated, 369 U.S. 403 (1962);
Badger Meter Manufacturing Co. v. Brennah, 216 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
cert den., 373 U.S. 902 (1963) (all Internal Revenue Service); Burnham v. United
States, 297 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1961) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Bowles
v. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co., 55 F. Cupp. 9 (W.D. Ky. 1944) (Office of Price
Administration); United States v. General Pharmacal Co., supra note 83 (Food
and Drug Administration).
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explanation is that on the facts of most of these cases there was not a
sufficiently active misrepresentation to constitute a fraud.90
It should be noted that in this area, at least, the courts do not speak
of whether the defendant has "waived" his rights, but whether the
conduct of the police violated a certain standard of reasonableness. A
right cannot be "intentionally abandoned" by a person when he is not
aware that the right is in jeopardy, even if the mistaken belief is the
result of accident or a benign misrepresentation by the police.
FOURTH AMENDMENT WARNING
Ever since Johnson v. Zerbst,91 the Federal courts have continually
cited it for the proposition that in order for a consent to function as a
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, "it must be 'intelligently given;'
that is, an intentional abandonment of a known right or privilege.
'92
However, with few exceptions,9 3 the courts have failed to squarely
face the logical implications of this statement in face of the defendant's
lack of actual knowledge of his rights, until the decision in Miranda v.
Arizona.94 Since that time the issue has become hotly litigated, with most
of the state court decisions rejecting the necessity of a warning.9 5 The
Federal decisions are more evenly divided.9 6
The reasons behind the holdings are diverse. Most of the decisions
requiring a warning are based on either a logical extension of Miranda
'United States v. Burnham, 297 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1961). Compare cases where the
intent of the police taints an otherwise permissible act. Massachusetts v. Painten,
368 .2d 142 (1st Cir. 1966) (intent to search and arrest without probable cause);
Taglavore v. United States, 271 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) (sham arrest).
91Supra, note 5.
"Id. at 464. Accord, Judd v. United States, supra note 4; United States v. Page,
supra note 4; United States v. Smith, supra note 60; Villano v. United States, supra
note 5; Montana v. Tomich, supra note 4; Cipres v. United States, supra note 4;
Wren v. United States, supra note 4; United States ex. rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378
F.2d 398 (3rd Cir. 1967).
"United States v. Nikrasch, supra note 30; United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp.
478 (D. D.C. 1959), United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
"'Supra, note 39.
'State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 159 N.W.2d 915 (1967), aff'd. on hearing by full
court, 182 Neb. 802, 157 N.W.2d 403 (1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1044 (1969); State
v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 16 427 P.2d 616 (1967); Lamot v. State, 2 Md.App. 378,
234 A.2d 615 (1967); State v. Leavitt, 237 A.2d 309 (R.I.), cert. den., 393 U.S. 851
(1968) ; State v. Frisby, 245 A.2d 786 (Del. 1968); People v. Trent, 85 Ill.App.2d
157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967); State v. Oldham, 92 Ida. 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968);
State v. Williams ...... Mont ....... 455 P.2d 634 (1969). Contra, State v. Williams,
248 Ore. 85, 432 P.2d 679 (1967).
"In addition to the cases cited in note 93 supra, Gorman v. United States, supra note 4
(no warning required); United States ex. rel. Anderson v. Rundle, supra, note 64
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to Fourth Amendment rights9'7 or a literal application of the holding in
Johnson v. Zerbst9s and the dicta in the consent search cases which follow
it.9 Those decisions rejecting a warning requirement are founded on
either the theoretical differences in the purposes served by the Fourth
and Fifth Amendmients, °00 on the theory that the Miranda warning is
adequate protection for the individual,rn or on a fear of "shackling" the
police.'
0 2
Although a Fourth Amendment warning seems desirable, as an ab-
stract proposition, in that it would allow a person to make up his mind
whether or not to permit a search, in perfect knowledge of his rights,
there are compelling reasons for not requiring such a warning, at least
not until there is more concrete evidence that such a warning is essential
to safeguard the rights of the accused.
. Most truly questionable consents occur in a "police dominated atmos-
phere" such that the Miranda warning is required; and, as was stated
previously, if the warning is not given, the "fruits" of such a consent are
no less suppressible than an admission or confession. Moreover, a strong
case is made in United States v. Gorman 0 3 that Miranda, by warning the
defendant of his keystone right to silence' 0 4 and by dispelling the "in-
herent pressures" of the interrogation process, furnishes an adequate
minimum of protection to the individual.
Additionally, when police interrogate a suspect, they are invariably
intending to obtain some sort of incriminating information from him, if
only a "story" to be used for impeachment purposes. Such an interroga-
tion is not necessarily conducted with a view toward obtaining assent to
search. All of this raises a valid question whether the marginal protection
to the individual justifies the imposition on the police, by Constitutional
imperative, of an additional, repetitive, and "slightly ridiculous" 0 5 warn-
ing requirement.
This is not to minimize the ser'tus social problems at which a Fourth
Amendment warning is aimed. Bccanse no two sets of facts are exactly
alike, the subjective standards now in force tend to work inconsistently
and leave the fate of the accused up to the predilections of individual
"E.g., State v. Williams 248 Ore. 85, 432 P.2d 679 (1967); United States v. Moder-
acki, supra, note 96.
OsSupra, note 5.
"Supra, note 92.
'E.g., State v. Forney, supra, note 95; State v. McCarty, supra, note 95.
'O'Gorman v. United States, supra, note 4.
"Porter v. Ashmore, 298 F. Supp. 951 (D. S.C. 1969).
"'Supra, note 4.
"'Supra, note 39 at 467-68.
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judges. 10 A related but no less serious problem is the tendency of some
judges to believe the police over the accused,' 0 7 whether from long ex-
perience with recidivists or from a desire not to see the obviously guilty
prisoner escape punishment over a "technicality."'' 0 8
More fundamentally, the whole notion of consent searches is subject
to significant doubts. Most such searches occur when the police either
do not have probable cause to obtain a search warrant, justify an
arrest or when they are unwilling to go to the trouble to obtain a warrant.
A relaxed judicial attitude toward such searches could turn the guaran-
tees of the Fourth Amendment into a "form of words."'10 9
CONCLUSION: SHOULD A FOURTH AMENDMENT WARNING BE
REQUIRED?
The above suggests the need for caution before any judicially con-
ceived warning is imposed as a Constitutional requirement. Perhaps a
less drastic measure which would achieve the same results would be to
strengthen the existing requirement that the state must bear the burden
of proving a voluntary consent by, for example, requiring the trial court
to find the specific facts on which it bases its conclusion that the defend-
ant waived his rights. In any event, more time is needed to determine the
effect of the Miranda warning on police interrogation practices.
In the past, some of the decisions of the Supreme Court concerning
criminal law have been rightfully accused of having been decided in an
intellectual vacuum, divorced from the realities of American criminal
justice" 0 The trend away from this culminated in Miranda, which can
only be viewed as having been brought on by the realities of police interro-
gation. 1 It would be ironic and unfortunate if Miranda itself were ex-
tended not on the basis of the realistic needs of protecting the rights of the
accused, but on a similar process of intellectualization.
HAROLD V. DYE
0, 'Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed based on information as to
his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities can never be more
than a speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 468.
l01E.g., McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962).
"'Porter v. Ashmore, supra, note 102.
:"'Silvertone Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, note 42 at 392 (Holmes, J.).
"'E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which set up the "special circumstances"
test for the state to be required to provide counsel for indigents in felony cases.
-'In Miranda some thirteen pages at the beginning of the opinion are devoted to a
review of these practices. 384 U.S. at 445-58.
1969]
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